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TRUST LAW:  SETTLOR IGNORANCE OF APPLICABLE LAWS 
MAY CONSTITUTE A MISTAKE OF LAW UNDER NORTH 
DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 59-12-15 
In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement 




In In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court held that the mistaken legal effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of 
applicable laws may warrant trust reformation under North Dakota Century 
Code section 59-12-15 if the moving party proves beyond clear and 
convincing evidence that such effects negate the settlor’s intentions in 
creating the trust.  With this conclusion, the court unequivocally rejected 
the application of contracting principles within the context of trust 
reformation claims.  As a matter of first impression in North Dakota, 
Matthew Larson resolves a number of questions under North Dakota trust 
reformation law, but the decision unfortunately leaves some issues 
unresolved, the most important of which is Matthew Larson’s applicability 
to commercial trust reformation claims.  Because contracting principles will 
control commercial trust reformation claims, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court will have to qualify Matthew Larson so to apply solely to 
noncommercial trust reformations. In doing so, North Dakota will have to 
adopt a bifurcated trust reformation scheme that recognizes two distinct 
categories of trust reformation claims that are premised upon the exchange 
of consideration or the lack thereof. 
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I. FACTS 
Throughout the years, William and Patricia Clairmont, Matthew 
Larson’s grandparents, created various irrevocable trusts for the benefit of 
their grandchildren.1  In 1996, the Clairmonts created the Matthew Larson 
Trust Agreement, which directed the trust’s trustee to equally distribute the 
trust’s remainder to Matthew’s brothers and sisters if Matthew died before 
 
 1. In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, 2013 ND 85, ¶ 3, 831 N.W.2d 388, 390. 
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the trustee completely distributed the trust and Matthew left no surviving 
issue.2  Additionally, in 2009, the Clairmonts created the Matthew J. Larson 
Irrevocable Retirement Trust II Agreement,3 which provided that 
Matthew’s brothers and sisters would equally benefit from the trust if 
Matthew died intestate and without a spouse who had attained the age of 
sixty or any other descendants.4 
Matthew later died intestate with no decedents.5  Prior to Matthew’s 
death, Matthew’s parents, Greg and Cindy Larson,6 divorced.7  Greg Larson 
subsequently fathered N.J.L. and L.M.L., both of whom were Matthew’s 
half-blooded siblings.8  Since Matthew died intestate, North Dakota 
Century Code section 30.1-04-07 dictated that both N.J.L and L.M.L. were 
entitled to inherit the trust benefits the same as Matthew’s full-blooded 
siblings.9  The Clairmonts, who intended to limit the trusts’ benefits to their 
lineal descendants,10 were unaware of North Dakota Century Code section 
30.1-04-07 or its implications at the time they executed either trust.11  
Accordingly, the Clairmonts petitioned the district court to reform both 
trusts under North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15.12  The district 
court applied contracting principles13 to conclude that a settlor’s ignorance 
of applicable laws cannot constitute a mistake of law under North Dakota 
Century Code section 59-12-15.14  Additionally, even if the law allowed 
trust reformation based upon the effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of 
applicable laws, the court found no evidence that the Clairmonts explicitly 
sought to restrict the trust benefits to their lineal decedents.15  Therefore, the 
court denied the Clairmonts’ reformation claim and allowed N.J.L. and 
L.M.L. to benefit from both trusts. 16 
 
2. Id. 
3. Id. ¶ 5, 832 N.W.2d at 390. 
4. Id. ¶ 5, 831 N.W.2d at 390-91. 
5. Id. ¶ 6, 831 N.W.2d at 391. 
6. Cindy Larson was one of the Clairmonts’ four children.  Id. ¶ 2, 831 N.W.2d at 390. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. “Relatives of the half blood inherit the same share they would inherit if they were of the 
whole blood.”  N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-04-07 (1973). 
10. Matthew Larson, ¶ 6, 831 N.W.2d at 391. 
11. Id. ¶ 22, 831 N.W.2d at 396. 
12. Courts may reform a trust “if it is proved . . . that both the settlor’s intent and the terms of 
the trust were affected by a mistake of fact or law, whether in expression or inducement.”  N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 59-12-15 (2007). 
13. Matthew Larson, ¶ 11, 831 N.W.2d at 392. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. ¶ 11, 831 N.W.2d at 393. 
16. Id. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In recent decades, benefactors have increasingly turned to trusts for 
estate planning, probate avoidance, and commercial transactions.17  This 
trust proliferation unfortunately exposed the porous and mercurial nature of 
the existing statutory and common laws concerning trusts, much to the legal 
community’s chagrin.18  In an effort to remedy this dismay, the Uniform 
Law Commission commissioned and adopted the Uniform Trust Code 
(“UTC”).19  The UTC amalgamated existing principles and certain 
reforms20 into a comprehensive set of codes that sought to provide 
consistency and uniformity across the law.21  
Like many states, changing contemporary circumstances rendered 
North Dakota’s existing common and statutory laws progressively 
antiquated.22  Prior to 2007, North Dakota’s trust law, which consisted of 
only basic governing principles and procedures,23 remained largely 
unchanged since its codification in 1877.24  Problematically, the relative 
absence of any case law interpreting these laws exacerbated the dilating 
disconnect between this existing statutory scheme and contemporary 
realities.25  In response to this antiquation, the North Dakota Legislature 
codified the UTC in 2007 as North Dakota Century Code title 59,26 and the 
UTC now generally governs trust creation and administration in North 
Dakota.27 
A. REFORMATION PRINCIPLES UNDER NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY 
CODE SECTION 59-12-15  
Section 415 of the UTC, which North Dakota codified verbatim as 
North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15, governs trust reformations28 
 
17. Kirsten Franzen & Bradley Myers, Improving the Law Through Codification:  Adoption 
of the Uniform Trust Code in North Dakota, 86 N.D. L. REV. 321, 323 (2010). 
18. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (2000). 
19. Franzen & Myers, supra note 17, at 323. 
20. David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000):  Significant Provisions and Policy 
Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143, 149 (2002). 
21. UNIF. TRUST CODE prefatory note (2000). 
22. See N.D. LEG. COUNCIL, UNIF. TRUST CODE—BACKGROUND MEMORANDUM, Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 59th Sess., at 3 (N.D. 2005), available at http://www.legis nd.gov/assembly/59-
2005/docs/pdf/79025.pdf. 
23. Franzen & Myers, supra note 17, at 326. 
24. Id. at 325. 
25. N.D. LEG. COUNCIL, supra note 22, at 3. 
26. Matthew Larson, ¶ 13, 831 N.W.2d at 394. 
27. The North Dakota Legislature did not adopt the UTC in whole.  See Franzen & Myers, 
supra note 17, at 331. 
28. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (2000). 
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and is applicable to both testamentary and inter vivos trusts.29  The UTC 
drafters derived this section from Restatement (Third) of Property: 
Donative Transfers section 12.130 (“Restatement”) and other common law 
principles.31  These sections allow reformation because a mistake should 
not be allowed to defeat settlor intent.32  The UTC adopted this permissive 
policy for section 415 to provide judicial flexibility33 in achieving the 
paramount objectives of properly effectuating settlor intent34 and preventing 
unjust enrichment.35  
Under UTC section 415, reformation is appropriate where a mistake of 
law or fact, whether in inducement or expression, affects the trust’s specific 
terms and where such a mistake negates the settlor’s intentions in creating 
the trust.36  For these purposes, a mistake of fact occurs where a party’s 
belief does not correspond with the material facts of a transaction.37  
Contrastingly, a mistake of law occurs where a party misunderstands the 
legal consequences of a particular course of action.38  Providing 
illumination on the issue, the Restatement furnishes eight illustrations of 
these mistakes in application.39 
Most pertinent to this discussion, the Restatement expounds the 
principle of mistake of law by misapplication of law in Illustration 7.40  In 
this illustration, the settlor intended to create a revocable trust but 
unknowingly failed to expressly reserve the power of revocation required 
by law.41  The applicable law subsequently barred the settlor from revoking 
the trust when the settlor so desired.42  In this situation, the Restatement 
 
29. David English, supra note 20, at 149. 
30. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. b (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 1995). 
31. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (2000).  The Uniform Law Commission intended for 
the Restatement to aid in interpreting UTC § 415. 
32. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. c (2001). 
33. See UNIF. TRUST CODE Art. 4, Refs & Annos. (2000). 
34. Id.; Estate of Taylor, 522 A.2d 641, 642 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (effectuating settlor intent 
is controlling unless contrary to law). 
35. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. b (2001). 
36. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (2000).  A mistake of expression occurs where the trust, as a 
result of a scrivener’s error, misstates the settlor intentions, includes a term that the scrivener 
should have excluded, or excludes a term that the scrivener should have included.  Contrastingly, 
a mistake of inducement occurs where the trust, as a result of settlor error, reflects the settlor’s 
intent but the settlor based such intent upon a mistake of fact or law.  Id. cmt. 
37. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (9th ed. 2009). 
38. See Matthew Larson, ¶ 19, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (2001). 
40. Id. cmt. i., illus. 7. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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dictates that the court should reform the trust so as to include a power of 
revocation if the moving party satisfies its onus of production.43  
The party seeking reformation, which may include a trust’s settlors,44 
trustees, or beneficiaries,45 bears the burden of proving each of UTC section 
415’s elements46 by clear and convincing evidence.47  In determining 
whether the movant satisfies this burden, the court must consider all direct 
and circumstantial evidence pertinent to establishing settlor intent,48 
regardless of whether such evidence contradicts the meaning of the trust’s 
language.49  Courts may consider this potentially suspect evidence because 
such evidence may be correct50 and the challenger’s heightened burden of 
production sufficiently hedges against the erroneous reliance on fraudulent 
or mistaken evidence.51  Provided that the movant demonstrates the virtue 
of its reformation claim, the court may consider the proper method of 
reformation and whether any circumstances exist that might preclude 
reformation. 
B. JUDICIAL REFORMATION AND DEFENSES TO REFORMATION 
Certain circumstances will forestall a trust reformation claim, 
regardless of whether the movant satisfies its burden of production.  For 
instance, reformation is inappropriate where a settlor experienced a post hoc 
change of heart or where a settlor failed to properly prepare and execute the 
trust documents.52  Additionally, a reformation claim is ineffective where 
the unintended beneficiary, without knowledge of the circumstances 
justifying reformation, changes its position in a manner that would render 
 
43. Id. 
44. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-13 (2010). 
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-15 (2010). 
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. c (2001). 
47. Id.  “[U]nder the clear and convincing standard, the evidence must be such that the trier 
of fact is reasonably satisfied with the facts the evidence tends to prove as to be led to a firm belief 
or conviction.”  Zundel v. Zundel, 278 N.W.2d 123, 130 (N.D. 1979). 
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. b (2001).  
Permissible direct evidence may include evidence concerning the settlor’s statements, letters, or 
conversations with the agent charged with drafting the trust.  Permissible circumstantial evidence 
may include evidence concerning the circumstances under which the settlor created the trust.  Id. 
cmt. d. 
49. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (2000).  In imposing the heightened standard of clear and 
convincing evidence, the Restatement disposes of the plain meaning rule.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROP.:  DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. d (2001). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. cmt. h. 
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reformation inequitable.53  Moreover, laches prohibits reformation where 
reformation would be inequitable because of temporal considerations.54  If 
none of these defenses to reformation are available, the court may consider 
how to properly reform the trust.  
The UTC affords a great deal of judicial discretion and flexibility in 
reforming trusts so as to effectuate settlor intent.55  In reconciling the given 
circumstances with the nature of the mistake, courts may strike the language 
tending to cause the mistake or add language tending to resolve the 
mistake.56  In determining the most appropriate form of reformation, a court 
must necessarily predicate its reformation order based upon the 
particularities of a given situation.57  After determining the most appropriate 
method of reformation, the judicial issuance of the reformation order 
retroactively reforms the trust as of the date the settlor executed the trust.58   
C. TRUST REFORMATION V. CONTRACTUAL REFORMATION 
The aforementioned principles of trust reformations are peculiarly 
related to those principles governing contractual reformations.  Under 
contracting law, reformation is inappropriate unless the parties make a 
mutual mistake about the contract’s legal effects because the parties 
exchanged consideration for the contract’s benefits.59  Under trust law, a 
settlor’s unilateral mistake generally warrants trust reformation60 because 
the beneficiary exchanged no consideration for the trust’s benefits.61  
Accordingly, the exchange of consideration or the lack thereof distinguishes 
 
53. Id. cmt. m.  It should be noted that the mere erroneous distribution of trust assets does not 
preclude reformation.  Id. cmt. f. 
54. Id. cmt. m.  Passage of time may also bar a claim for reformation by virtue of an 
applicable statute of limitations.  Id. 
55. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (2000). 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Judicial orders for reformation are applicable from the date of execution because 
“[r]eformation does not change the agreement; it enforces the agreement.”  Brinker v. Wobaco 
Trust Ltd., 610 S.W.2d 160, 166 (Tex. App. 1980).  However, the relation back to the date of 
origination does not apply to certain parties.  See Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States, 397 
F.2d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 1968) (relation back inapplicable to nonparties); L. E. Myers Co. v. Harbor 
Ins. Co., 384 N.E.2d 1340, 1346 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (relation back inapplicable where it would 
violate public policy). 
59. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-14 (1943); Carlson v. Sweeney et al., 895 N.E.2d 1191, 1199 
(Ind. 2008). 
60. Moore v. Adkins, 576 P.2d 245, 253 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978); Brinker, 610 S.W.2d at 163-
64; Joseph W. deFuria, Jr., Mistakes in Wills Resulting from Scriveners’ Errors:  The Argument 
for Reformation, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 32 (1990). 
61. Carlson, 895 N.E.2d at 1199. 
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the two bodies of law so that contracting principles are generally 
inapplicable to trusts.62 
This differentiation is imperative because of how these bodies of law 
consider the mistaken legal effects caused by one’s ignorance of applicable 
laws.  Under contracting law, one’s ignorance of applicable laws cannot 
warrant contractual reformation because courts will not interfere with a 
contract where the contract represents the parties’ intentions but one party 
misunderstood the contract’s legal effects.63  Contrastingly, under trust law, 
courts have generally found that the mistaken legal effects caused by a 
settlor’s ignorance of applicable laws constitutes a mistake of law because 
the trust is strictly gratuitous.64  Saliently, courts will still grant a trust 
reformation where a settlor was negligent in discovering a potential 
mistake65 or where the mistake arises because of a settlor’s lack of care.66  
Because of these differing standards, determining whether contracting or 
trust laws are applicable to a given reformation claim will most likely 
dictate the disposition of the claim.67 
D. PRIOR APPLICATION OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 
59-12-15 
 Although the North Dakota Supreme Court never had occasion to 
interpret North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15 prior to Matthew 
Larson,68 the court previously applied North Dakota Century Code section 
59-12-15 to other trust reformation claims.  In Agnes M. Gassmann Trust 
Wells Fargo Bank v. Reichert,69 a trust’s distributional provisions 
erroneously conflicted with the settlors’ intentions.70  On appeal, the court 
only considered whether the proffered evidence indicated that the district 
 
62. Id. 
63. Hovden v. Lind, 301 N.W.2d 374, 379 n.1 (N.D. 1981); 66 AM. JUR.2d Reformation of 
Instruments § 17 (1973) (“Where the thought to be expressed was the idea that the parties 
intended to convey, then the mistake is only one of legal consequences, and there can be no relief 
by way of reformation.”). 
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 333 (1959).  It should be noted that there is some 
authority to the contrary.  See Webb v. Webb, 301 S.E.2d 570, 576 (W.Va. 1983) (“it is 
recognized that a party may not avoid the legal consequences on the ground of mistake . . . where 
such mistake is the result of the negligence of the complaining party.”). 
65. Brinker, 610 S.W.2d at 164. 
66. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 59 (1937); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:  
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. l (2001). 
67. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmt. a (2003); Moore, 576 P.2d at 
253. 
68. Matthew Larson, ¶ 12, 831 N.W.2d at 393. 
69. 2011 ND 169, 802 N.W.2d 889. 
70. Id. ¶ 4, 802 N.W.2d at 891. 
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court’s reformation order was clearly erroneous.71  The court, finding in the 
negative, affirmed the district court’s reformation order.72  Because 
Reichert concerned issues associated with adequacy of evidence rather than 
interpretations of law, Reichert provided little guidance for Matthew 
Larson’s issues of first impression. 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Matthew Larson, the North Dakota Supreme Court, with Justice 
Crothers writing for the majority, determined that the mistaken legal effects 
caused by a settlor’s ignorance of applicable laws may constitute a mistake 
of law under North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15 if the moving 
party proves beyond clear and convincing evidence that such effects negate 
the settlor’s intentions in creating the trust.73  Because the Clairmonts 
satisfied this burden, the court ordered reformation of both trusts so that 
only the Clairmonts’ lineal descendants could benefit from the trusts, which 
excluded N.J.L. and L.M.L. as beneficiaries.74  In coming to such 
conclusions, the court held that principles controlling contractual 
reformations and trust interpretations are inapplicable to trust 
reformations.75  Justice Maring joined the majority’s findings of law,76 but 
would have remanded the case for additional fact-finding.77 
A. TRUST REFORMATION, CONTRACT PRINCIPLES, AND IGNORANCE 
The question of the proper interpretation of North Dakota Century 
Code section 59-12-15 was a matter of first impression in North Dakota.78  
In his brief, Greg Larson urged the court to refer to the contracting 
principles articulated in North Dakota Century Code section 9-03-1479 in 
interpreting North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15.80  Since 
ignorance of applicable laws cannot constitute a mistake of law under North 
Dakota Century Code section 9-03-14,81 Greg Larson concluded that the 
 
71. Id. ¶ 8, 802 N.W.2d at 892. 
72. Id. ¶ 23, 802 N.W.2d at 896. 
73. Matthew Larson, ¶ 20, 831 N.W.2d at 396. 
74. Id. ¶ 27, 831 N.W.2d at 398. 
75. Id. ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
76. Id. ¶ 33, 831 N.W.2d at 399. 
77. Id. ¶ 40, 831 N.W.2d at 401. 
78. Id. ¶ 12, 831 N.W.2d at 393. 
79.  N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-14 (1943) (providing what constitutes a mistake of law under 
contracting law).   
80. Matthew Larson, ¶ 14, 831 N.W.2d at 394. 
81. See supra Part II.C. 
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Clairmonts were not entitled to reformation.82  Contrastingly, the 
Clairmonts argued that reformation was appropriate under North Dakota 
Century Code section 59-12-15 because a mistake of law created a result 
that was inconsistent with the their intentions in creating the trusts.83 
The North Dakota Supreme Court considered these positions and began 
its analysis by reciting the aforementioned principles of trust reformation 
law.84  Under North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15, reformation is 
appropriate where the petitioner shows by clear and convincing evidence 
what the settlors’ intentions were in creating the trust and that a mistake 
affected the trust’s terms.85  Citing the UTC comments, the court noted that 
it must refer to the Restatement for illustrations of reformation principles in 
application.86  Additionally, the court stipulated that it was bound by the 
UTC’s general purpose of providing uniformity and consistency in the law 
in interpreting the rules of reformation.87  With the policy objectives of 
effectuating settlor intent88 and preventing unjust enrichment89 in mind, the 
court turned to the matters at hand. 
Beginning with the first issue for disposition, the court declined Greg 
Larson’s invitation to apply contracting principles within the context of 
trust reformations.90  The court emphasized the fact that contractual 
reformations require that the parties make a mutual and substantially similar 
mistake about the contract’s legal effect because courts are hesitant to 
create unagreed upon bargains.91  Courts do not require this mutuality for 
trust reformations because the trust only concerns the settlor’s intentions in 
making the donative gift.92  Because the issue of exchanged consideration 
creates a fundamental distinction between the two bodies of law,93 the court 
found that principles governing contractual reformations do not control trust 
reformations.94   
 
82. Brief for Appellant, ¶ 45, In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, 2013 ND 85, 831 
N.W.2d 388 (No. 2012-0319). 
83. Matthew Larson, ¶ 68, 831 N.W.2d at 391. 
84. Id. ¶ 10, 831 N.W.2d at 391; Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 831 N.W.2d at 393-94. 
85. Id. ¶ 13, 831 N.W.2d at 394. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. ¶ 12, 831 N.W.2d at 393. 
88. Id. ¶ 10, 831 N.W.2d at 391. 
89. Id. ¶ 13, 831 N.W.2d at 394. 
90. Id. ¶ 14, 831 N.W.2d at 394. 
91. Id. ¶ 15, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
92. See id. ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
93. The court implied that its analysis was not all encompassing by referring readers to 
existing case law from other jurisdictions.  Id. ¶ 15, 831 N.W.2d at 394-95. 
94. Id. 
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Since North Dakota Century Code section 9-03-14 and its progeny 
could not aid in interpreting North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15, 
the court continued its analysis by addressing whether the mistaken legal 
effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of applicable laws may constitute a 
mistake of law under North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15.  
Because North Dakota Century Code title 59 lacks a definition as to what 
constitutes a mistake of law,95 the court referred to and adopted the 
definition found in Black’s Law Dictionary,96 which provides that a mistake 
of law is “[a] mistake about the legal effect of a known fact or situation.”97  
After this promulgation, the court noted that the mistake of law in 
inducement referred to in North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15 
arises where the trust provisions accurately reflect the settlor’s intent but the 
settlor erroneously included or excluded a certain term because of a 
misapplication of existing law.98  Pursuant to the comments of UTC 
section 415,99 the court referred to the Restatement for illustrations of these 
principles in application.100 
Stating that Restatement Illustration 7 was analogous to the case at bar, 
the court determined that a settlor’s awareness of an applicable law is not 
required for an action to constitute a mistake of law.101  The court 
specifically observed that Illustration 7 did not state that the settlor was 
aware of the applicable law, only that the settlor misapprehended the law’s 
legal effects.102  Accordingly, because the Clairmonts’ misapprehended the 
legal effects of using the term “brothers and sisters,” the district court erred 
in finding that, as a matter of law, the Clairmonts’ failed to satisfy the 
requirements of North Dakota Century Code section 59-12-15.103  However, 
the court noted that the legal effects caused by the Clairmonts’ ignorance 
would warrant reformation of the trusts only if the Clairmonts provided 
clear and convincing evidence of such effects.104 
 
95. Id. ¶ 17, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
96. Id. 
97. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (9th ed. 2009). 
98. Matthew Larson, ¶¶ 17-18, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
99. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (2000). 
100. Matthew Larson, ¶¶ 18-19, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. ¶ 19, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
103. Id. ¶ 20, 831 N.W.2d at 396. 
104. Id. 
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B. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE WARRANTING REFORMATION 
Citing the district court’s findings of facts, the court found that the 
Clairmonts satisfied this onus of production.105  The Clairmonts each 
testified that they intended for only their lineal grandchildren to benefit 
from the trusts in the event that one of their grandchildren passed before the 
trusts’ natural expirations.106  Additionally, the attorney who drafted the 
first trust testified that he never discussed the potential implications of 
North Dakota Century Code section 30.1-04-07 with the Clairmonts107 and 
that he never understood it to be the Clairmonts’ intentions to include N.J.L. 
and L.M.L. as beneficiaries.108  Furthermore, one of the trustees testified 
that the Clairmonts created the trusts to protect their grandchildren’s long-
term financial viability.109  Based upon such information, the court 
concluded that the Clairmonts never intended to include N.J.L. or L.M.L. as 
beneficiaries and that the trusts should be reformed accordingly.110 
C. INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES INAPPLICABLE TO REFORMATIONS 
With this conclusion, the court disregarded Greg Larson’s argument 
that the proffered evidence failed to evince clear and convincing 
evidence.111  Greg Larson contended that the court should discern the 
Clairmonts’ intentions from the face of the trust documents.112  Specifically, 
Greg Larson argued that the Clairmonts actually intended to allow persons 
not of Clairmont lineage to benefit from the trusts because each trust 
allowed as much under limited circumstances.113  Accordingly, Greg Larson 
concluded that N.J.L and L.M.L. should remain beneficiaries of both trusts 
because such inclusion would be consistent with the trusts’ language.114 
The court, conceding that courts will discern settlor intent from the 
trust document if the document is unambiguous,115 rejected Greg Larson’s 
argument because such principles are applicable only to trust 
 
105. Id. ¶ 27, 831 N.W.2d at 398. 
106. Id. ¶ 22, 831 N.W.2d at 396. 
107. Id. ¶ 23, 831 N.W.2d at 396-97. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. ¶ 24, 831 N.W.2d at 397. 
110. Id. ¶ 27, 831 N.W.2d at 397. 
111. Id. ¶ 25, 831 N.W.2d at 397.   
112. Id. 
113. Id. For instance, Matthew could designate a potential beneficiary or convey his trust 
assets to creditors.  Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
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interpretations.116  The court observed that trust interpretation and 
reformation claims are inherently dissimilar because interpretation claims 
solely concern language already contained within the trust document 
whereas reformation claims may involve the addition or subtraction of 
language from the original document.117  Thus, the court rejected Greg 
Larson’s argument and found that principles of trust interpretations are 
inapplicable to trust reformations.118  
D. MAJORITY’S CONCLUSION 
In concluding its analysis, the court again noted that the district court 
misconstrued the law in rejecting the Clairmonts’ reformation claim 
because the legal effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of applicable laws 
may warrant trust reformation under North Dakota Century Code section 
59-12-15.119  Given the totality of the record, the court opined “that the only 
conclusion to be reached is that a mistake of law was made affecting the 
terms of the trusts and the Clairmonts’ intent.”120 In order to rectify this 
mistake in light of the foregoing principles, the court remanded the case to 
the district court with the instruction to reform both trusts so that only those 
individuals of Clairmont lineage could benefit from the trusts.121 
E. MARING CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART 
Justice Maring concurred in the majority’s conclusions of law.122  
However, Justice Maring found that there was insufficient evidence to make 
a warranted conclusion as to whether the Clairmonts met their standard of 
production123 because the available evidence was susceptible to conflicting 
interpretations.124  As such, Justice Maring would have remanded the case 
for further fact-finding.125 
IV. IMPACT 
As a matter of first impression, Matthew Larson presents a number of 





119. Id. ¶ 28, 831 N.W.2d at 397. 
120. Id. ¶ 27. 
121. Id. ¶ 27. 
122. Id. ¶ 31, 831 N.W.2d at 398 (Maring, J., concurring). 
123. Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 831 N.W.2d at 399. 
124. Id. ¶ 39, 831 N.W.2d at 401. 
125. Id. ¶ 40, 831 N.W.2d at 401. 
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burgeoning class of aging benefactors.  First, because Matthew Larson 
appears to create conflicting interpretations concerning the consequences of 
one’s ignorance within North Dakota trust law, the court may have to 
elaborate on the consequences of one’s ignorance in other trust contexts and 
the extent to which the court may be willing to redefine other established 
legalese in the limited context of trust reformation claims.  Second, the 
North Dakota Supreme Court may have to elaborate on the extent to which, 
if any, it is willing to rely upon contracting principles to help develop North 
Dakota trust reformation law.  Finally, because contracting principles will 
control commercial trust reformation claims, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court will have to qualify Matthew Larson so to apply solely to 
noncommercial trust reformations, which will necessarily create two classes 
of trust reformation claims in North Dakota. 
A. MISTAKE OF LAW DEFINED 
As a matter of first impression, Matthew Larson will surely influence 
the development of North Dakota trust law.  Specifically, the decision 
defines what constitutes a mistake of law under North Dakota Century Code 
title 59126 and takes an expansive interpretation of this definition to include 
the mistaken legal effects of unknown applicable laws.127  However, the 
extent of this influence remains unclear because Matthew Larson’s 
interpretation conflicts with the North Dakota Supreme Court’s previous 
holdings in other facets of trust law. 
In the trust interpretation case of Langer v. Pender,128 the North Dakota 
Supreme Court stated that “[w]hen you intend the facts to which the law 
attaches a consequence, you must abide the consequence whether you 
intend it or not.”129  With this statement, the court seemed to memorialize 
the adages that a “reasonable person is deemed to know the law” and 
“ignorance of the law is no excuse”130 within the context of North Dakota 
trust law.  Under these canons, ignorance is no mistake131 because a party 
may be indemnified of liability after committing a mistake but must account 
for its ignorance.132  By distinguishing Langer133 and articulating a new 
 
126. Id. ¶ 17, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
127. Id. ¶ 19, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
128. 2009 ND 51, 764 N.W.2d 159. 
129. Id. ¶ 29, 764 N.W.2d at 168 (quoting In re Estate of Duemeland, 528 N.W.2d 369, 371 
(N.D. 1995)). 
130. Retired Pub. Emp. Council of Wa. v. State Dept. of Ret. Sys., 16 P.3d 65, 68 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
131. Am. Sur. Co. of N.Y. v. Groover, 14 S.E.2d 149 (Ga. Ct. App. 1941). 
132. Brock v. O’Dell, 21 S.E.2d 976, 978 (S.C. 1895). 
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definition of a mistake of law that absolves the consequences of settlor 
ignorance, Matthew Larson thusly creates conflicting interpretations 
concerning the consequences of one’s ignorance within North Dakota 
Century Code title 59. 
This conflict raises numerous questions.  For instance will Langer or 
Matthew Larson’s position on ignorance and its associated consequences 
control when the North Dakota Supreme Court considers issues of first 
impression in other facets of trust law?  Additionally, since the court 
interpreted the term mistake of law contrary to longstanding edicts, would 
the court be willing to reinterpret other established legalese for the limited 
purpose of trust reformation claims?  The recent proliferation of trust usage 
will assuredly lead to an increase in litigation and the need for future 
elaboration on these and other questions. 
B. INFLUENCE OF CONTRACTING PRINCIPLES 
Matthew Larson’s influence on North Dakota trust law will also stem 
from the fact the decision seems to create a precarious relationship between 
contracting and trust reformation law in North Dakota.  It is curious that the 
North Dakota Supreme Court belabored the point that contracting principles 
do not govern trust reformations yet cited a contractual reformation case134 
and adopted a governing definition for the term “mistake of law” that 
Black’s Law Dictionary derived from established contracting law.135  This 
reliance on contracting principles raises an important question: 
notwithstanding the fact that contracting principles do not govern trust 
reformations, can contracting principles at least influence North Dakota 
trust reformation law after Matthew Larson? 
The aforementioned circumstances imply in the affirmative and such 
an inference is consistent with larger trends in the law.  Throughout the 
years, contracting and trust law have steadily converged to the extent that 
there no longer remains any material distinction between contracting and 
trust law in numerous respects.136  Some commentators conclude that this 
convergence emanates from the fact that trusts are fundamentally a 
“contractarian institution”137 and that trust law is actually a subset of 
 
133. Matthew Larson, ¶ 26, 831 N.W.2d at 397. 
134. Id. ¶ 10, 831 N.W.2d at 391 (citing Spitzer v. Bartleson, 2009 N.D. 179, 773 N.W.2d 
798)). 
135. Black’s Law Dictionary specifically refers to the cases contained in Contracts Keynote 
93(4) as the basis of its definition.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1092 (9th ed. 2009). 
136. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis for the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 
652-55 (1995). 
137. Id. at 628. 
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contract law.138  The convergence of trust and contracting law in these 
respects has manifested itself in the observation that courts have 
increasingly referred to trusts as contracts.139  Thus, one can construe the 
North Dakota Supreme Court’s limited deference to contracting principles 
in developing Matthew Larson as consistent with larger trends in trust law. 
Despite this observation, however, Matthew Larson still makes it 
unclear as to where exactly North Dakota trust reformation law figures into 
the relational dichotomy of trust and contracting law.  Contracting law will 
certainly not govern certain trust reformation claims after Matthew 
Larson.140  However, the court’s citations at least imply that contracting 
principles may guide the development of trust reformation law.  
Accordingly, in the future, the North Dakota Supreme Court may have to 
elaborate on the extent to which, if any, it is willing to rely upon contracting 
principles in developing North Dakota trust reformation law. 
C. FUTURE NEED TO DISTINGUISH MATTHEW LARSON 
In determining Matthew Larson’s future applicability, it is imperative 
to note that parties have increasingly turned to trusts to conduct business 
transactions as assets held in commercial trusts141 far exceed those held in 
noncommercial trusts.142  This increased pervasiveness makes it nearly 
inevitable that North Dakota courts will encounter claims seeking 
reformation of commercial trusts.  However, Matthew Larson will be of 
little import in these situations because the North Dakota Supreme Court 
predicated Matthew Larson upon the reasoning that contracting principles 
do not govern trust reformations for want of consideration.143   
In recognizing Matthew Larson’s limited future applicability, one must 
recognize that, with commercial trusts, the parties exchange consideration 
for transferring trust benefits.144 This recognition is of the utmost 
importance because, “where the owner of property receives consideration 
for making a transfer of the property in trust, the rules applicable to 
 
138. Id. at 627. 
139. David Horton, Unconsionability in the Law of Trusts, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675, 
1677 n.8 (2009). 
140. Matthew Larson, ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
141. Here, the term “commercial trust” refers to “a trust that implements bargained-for 
exchange.”  John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust:  The Trust as an Instrument of 
Commerce, 107 YALE L.J. 165, 167 (1997). 
142. English, supra note 20, at 149.  Here, noncommercial trusts refers to those trusts that do 
not qualify as commercial trusts. 
143. Matthew Larson, ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 394-95. 
144. See Langbein, supra note 137, at 167. 
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transfers for value and to contracts are applicable.”145  Applying these 
contracting principles to commercial trusts, courts may reform a 
commercial trust only where the parties make a mutual mistake of law or 
fact.146  Under this principle, the legal effects caused by a settlor’s 
ignorance of applicable laws would not warrant reformation because 
reformation is only appropriate under such circumstances where the parties 
make a mutual mistake of law or fact.147  Thus, Matthew Larson would 
have resulted in a different outcome had Matthew exchanged consideration 
for the enjoyment of the trust benefits. 
Due to this contradictory conclusion, the North Dakota Supreme Court 
will have to stipulate that the conclusion that “[b]ecause the creation of a 
trust is different than the execution of a contract, legal principles related to 
reformation of a contract do not control in trust cases”148 strictly applies to 
the reformation claims of noncommercial trusts.  Pursuant to this 
stipulation, North Dakota will have to recognize two distinct categories of 
trust reformation claims that are premised upon the exchange of 
consideration or the lack thereof.149  The creation of this bifurcated 
categorization is of paramount importance because, as seen above, the 
characterization of a particular trust as commercial or noncommercial and 
the associated applicability or inapplicability of contracting principles may 
dictate the disposition of a reformation claim.  Therefore, Matthew Larson 
will almost assuredly not be the court’s final interpretation of North Dakota 
Century Code section 59-12-15. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In In re Matthew Larson Trust Agreement, the North Dakota Supreme 
Court held that the mistaken legal effects caused by a settlor’s ignorance of 
applicable laws may warrant trust reformation under North Dakota Century 
Code section 59-12-15 if the moving party proves beyond clear and 
convincing evidence that such effects negate the settlor’s intentions in 
creating the trust.  In coming to this conclusion, the court articulated a new 
and expansive definition of the term mistake of law for the purposes of 
North Dakota Century Code title 59.  With these conclusions, the court also 
held that principles governing contractual reformations are inapplicable to 
 
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 333 cmt. e (1959). 
146. See supra Part II.C. 
147. Id. 
148. Matthew Larson, ¶ 16, 831 N.W.2d at 395. 
149. Some authority appears to recognize such a distinction.  See Moore, 576 P.2d at 253; 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 62 cmt. a (2003). 
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trust reformations.  Despite these clarifications, Matthew Larson leaves 
numerous questions unanswered and other issues potentially muddled, the 
most important of which is the broadly worded conclusion that contracting 
principles cannot control trust reformation claims.  For the foregoing 
reasons, such an unqualified pronouncement may have been misguided.  
Consequently, because contracting principles will control commercial trust 
reformation claims, the North Dakota Supreme Court will have to qualify 
Matthew Larson so to apply solely to noncommercial trust reformations.  In 
doing as much, North Dakota will have to recognize a bifurcated trust 
reformation scheme that involves two classes of trust reformation claims 
that are premised upon the exchange of consideration or lack thereof. 
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